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Introduction
Countries around the world have developed programs for agricul-
tural research and extension in order to promote innovation and 
development in the agricultural sector. However, the efficiency 
of such programs has been increasingly called into question as it 
becomes apparent that other agents in development, including 
farmers and their organizations, commercial buyers and input 
sellers, consultants, NGOs, the development community, and 
others also significantly contribute to agricultural innovation. 
In order to understand the roles of and relationships among the 
various agents that contribute to innovation processes, scholars 
increasingly use an innovation systems framework (see Box 1).
Decisionmakers in governments find it challenging to  
formulate policy measures that enhance the functioning  
and performance of such a complex agricultural innovation  
system. Traditional approaches to innovation policies have  
often focused narrowly on funding research in central research  
stations and diffusion and extension via technology-transfer  
agencies. Newer approaches suggest that governments become  
involved in strategic planning and priority setting for agricultural 
innovation and development; the provision of incentives  
for private agents such as farmers or technical assistance con-  
sultants; enhanced collaboration among farmers, researchers,  
and commercial agents; and strengthening of innovative  
capacities among farmers.
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M
any governments in developing countries attempt to foster agricultural development 
and innovation by setting up funding facilities, extension programs, and research 
centers and by subsidizing private-sector and farm activities through fiscal measures.  
However, when trying to manage complex innovation processes involving many and  
different actors, governments sometimes find it difficult to design effective interventions and 
therefore end up supporting and managing only the public research and extension organiza-
tions that directly depend upon them. With the aid of various donors, Bolivia introduced 
a scheme in 2001—the Bolivian Agricultural Technology System (SIBTA)—by which 
government support to agricultural research and extension was partly delegated to regional 
semiautonomous foundations. 
This brief presents the results of a study on the role of the Bolivian government in guiding 
and managing SIBTA. The study found that despite a number of weaknesses related to the 
design of the system and the government’s limited commitment, the regional foundations 
have been able to effectively identify the demands of small farmers, set priorities, and provide 
transparency and accountability with regard to funding and decisionmaking. It suggests that 
instead of micromanaging such foundations, the government should focus on the big picture 
and conduct policy analysis and strategic planning to identify opportunities for agricultural 
innovation and set up incentive mechanisms and information networks that support the 
many actors involved in innovation processes.
Frank Hartwich 
Heinz-Gerhard Jansen
Research Brief No. 8The main question for policymakers is how to effectively 
encourage and guide the various public and private actors on 
the national, regional, and local levels so they can contribute 
to the generation, diffusion, and application of innovations. 
One particular issue focuses on determining to what extent 
the government should be involved in formulating innovation 
policies and to what extent certain activities can be delegated 
to decentralized local institutions.
In 2001, the Bolivian government formed the Bolivian 
Agricultural Technology System, Sistema Boliviano de 
Tecnología Agropecuaria (SIBTA), a governing and funding 
mechanism to promote applied research and technology 
transfer for agricultural development. SIBTA is unique in its 
organizational structure; it is based on the principles of decen-
tralization, demand orientation, a market-based demand for 
technology, and the privatization of research and extension 
services. It enables the identification of local demands and 
the funding of research and development projects at the level 
of autonomous regional foundations. However, SIBTA’s 
experimental nature and the various levels of hierarchies and 
diversity of actors have posed many challenges, particularly 
with regard to its governance. 
This brief discusses the main factors related to the gover-
nance of SIBTA and discusses opportunities for the Bolivian 
government to better oversee and manage the system in the 
strategic areas of participation in priority setting, transparency 
and accountability, responsiveness, orientation toward impact, 
delegation, strengthening of linkages, and strategic vision.
Bolivia’s Past Experience in Agricultural  
Research and Extension 
Bolivia faces significant challenges in promoting broad-based 
agricultural innovation. Despite some anecdotal successes in 
cash crops such as soybeans in the tropical lowlands, average 
yields and productivity in Bolivia remain among the lowest in 
Latin America. Compared with other South American coun-
tries, Bolivia has the largest rural population and the highest 
percentage of rural people living below the poverty line. In 
certain rural areas, poverty levels can be as high as 90 percent.
Governments and donors have long made substantial ef-
forts to support agricultural research and extension, with mixed 
success. In the 1950s, the agricultural service agency Servicio 
Agrícola Interamericano (SAI) was mandated to carry out both 
research and extension activities with support from the United 
States and other donors; the results were ambiguous. Activi-
ties were revived in 1975 with the creation of both the Boliv-
ian Institute of Agricultural Technology, Instituto Boliviano de 
Tecnología Agropecuaria (IBTA), which established 15 experi-
mental research stations, and the Tropical Agriculture Research 
Center, Centro de Investigación Agricola Tropical (CIAT)1, which 
serviced the tropical lowland region around Santa Cruz in  
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Box 1:  Introducing the innovation  
     systems approach
Innovation: a new idea, practice, or object that is suc-
cessfully introduced into economic or social processes. In 
agriculture, this can include new knowledge or tech-
nologies related to primary production, processing, and 
commercialization—all of which can positively affect the 
productivity, competitiveness, and livelihoods of farmers 
and others. 
Innovator: the agent—farmer, processor, or some other 
private actor—who introduces and adopts the innova-
tion.  Researchers and extensionists are inventors, knowl-
edge transformers, and communicators who assist the 
innovator in the introduction of the innovation, which 
in any case may also occur without their contributions. 
There is a distinction between those who innovate and 
those who promote innovation. The promoters include 
researchers and extension agents, NGOs, opinion lead-
ers, leading producers, private knowledge consultants, 
and many others.
Innovation process: the process by which various 
forms of knowledge and technology are used in order to 
respond to social needs and market-articulated and tech-
nological demands and opportunities. Agents acquire 
technology and tacit and codified knowledge in complex 
processes of competence building, such as learning by 
doing, learning by using, and learning by interacting.
Innovation network: a specific socioeconomic and 
agroecological setting in which adopters and promoters 
of innovations interact in learning cycles to pursue an 
innovation opportunity. It is often related to a terri-
tory or an agricultural commodity but may well include 
producer–buyer relationships and knowledge exchange 
across country borders.
Innovation system: the whole set of actors and practices 
that constitute, perform, and participate in innovation 
processes, their interactions, and the structure and rules 
that guide their actions on a national or sector level, 
including spillovers from other innovation systems. An 
innovation system exists regardless of the level of govern-
ment intervention.
1In this document CIAT refers to the Bolivian agricultural research center for the lowlands, and not to the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical) of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)  
based in Cali, Colombia.particular. Both organizations followed a technology-transfer 
model based on research carried out on experimental stations to 
identify new and more efficient varieties and crop and animal 
management practices, disseminating the results to farmers 
through the use of extension agents and providing technical  
assistance and, occasionally, subsidized farm inputs.
During the 1980s, IBTA’s less-effective extension program 
was first significantly reduced and in the 1990s, after a World 
Bank loan that induced strategic reorientation toward research 
and entrepreneurship among farmers, closed down. After 
depletion of the loan, the government could not find sufficient 
funding sources to sustain IBTA’s remaining research activities. 
Management problems, political intromission, and unmotivated 
staff led to IBTA’s further deterioration and finally, after it was 
incapable of proving impact among farmers, IBTA ceased  
functioning altogether in 1997.
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Box 2: Main actors involved in the Bolivian Agricultural Technology System  
    (SIBTA)
The government. Government responsibility for SIBTA lies with the Technology and Food Safety Unit (UTS) under the 
Directory of Productive Development in the Ministry of Agriculture, today the Ministry of Rural and Agricultural Devel-
opment and Environment. The UTS is responsible for strategic orientation, national-level priorities, and coordination of 
activities among the various actors. In addition to other activities, the UTS develops regulations for funding mechanisms, 
organizes evaluations and stakeholder consultations, and facilitates linkages to international research and development 
agencies.
Donors. Approximately 50 percent of SIBTA’s funding comes from the Bolivian government via a loan from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). This is complemented by a basket-fund arrangement, the Fondo Común de Apoyo  
al SIBTA (FOCAS), from the governments of Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (DFID), and Denmark.  
Three other donors—the United States (USAID), Germany (GTZ), and Japan—provide geographically or thematically 
earmarked funding, and DFID also supported a program of institutional learning on SIBTA. SIBTA’s budget for 2002–
2007 was around US$60 million.
The Coordination Unit for the Agricultural Services Program (UCPSA). This unit was established under the Ministry in 
compliance with IDB loan requirements; it assures that the funds are efficiently and correctly administered and attributed 
to projects.  
The Foundations for Agricultural Technology Development (FDTAs). These four regional foundations, which have 
private legal status and a public mandate, promote agricultural innovation in the main agroecological regions: the high-
lands, valleys, semiarid lowlands (Chaco), and humid tropic lowlands. They manage funds for SIBTA’s main applied inno-
vation projects. They also receive funds directly from international donors and occasionally from local governments. Each 
foundation consists of more than 100 public- and private-sector and civil-society organizations that meet at an annual 
general assembly. They have an advisory board and an autonomous administration headed by a managing director elected 
by the board. FDTAs don’t execute research and extension; they set regional priorities, identify demands, channel funds to 
knowledge providers, and monitor their use. 
Beneficiaries. They are organized farmer groups with legal status, such as producer associations, community-based orga-
nizations, or indigenous groups, that request SIBTA’s services via applied innovation projects.  Beneficiaries are eligible to 
receive funding if they provide 15 percent of the total funding requested, be it on their own or through third parties such 
as local municipalities.
(Knowledge and technology) service providers. They include research organizations, university centers, and specialized 
private consultancy companies. The foundations commission them to provide services to the beneficiaries. Public organiza-
tions and especially universities find it almost impossible to qualify due to administrative obstacles. Main research centers 
include CIAT, which is affiliated with the regional government in Santa Cruz; the semi-public Foundation for Research 
and Promotion of Andean Crops (PROINPA); and the Pairumani Centre for Phytoecogenetic Research, which since 1972 
has been involved in genetic improvement of maize and pulses.SIBTA: Its Actors, their Interactions,  
and the Rules
In 1998, the Bolivian government began negotiations with the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and several bilateral 
development agencies to re-institutionalize the agricultural 
research and extension system. In 1999, the government and 
donor organizations struck a deal that formalized a Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAP) in the field of agricultural research and 
technology. The resulting Bolivian Agricultural Technology 
System (SIBTA) brings into play a diversity of actors contribut-
ing to the generation, diffusion, and application of innovation 
(see Box 2). 
SIBTA has developed three main mechanisms that enable 
interaction among agents to deliver services to beneficiaries: 
•	 Applied	Technological	Innovation	Projects	(PITAs).	The	
regional foundations solicit bids from producers who 
form an alliance with knowledge providers to submit joint 
proposals, and provide funding to the most promising 
proposals. Decisions are made by an anonymous com-
mittee on the basis of probability of impact and regional 
and national development priorities. In order to assure the 
receipt of worthy proposals, the regional foundations have 
often brokered contacts between beneficiaries and knowl-
edge providers and assisted in organizational and proposal 
development.
•	 Under	the	National	Strategic	Innovation	Projects	(PIEN),	
the Ministry of Agriculture’s technology unit approves 
funding for strategic research consortia. PIENs have been 
created in strategic research areas such as soil-fertility man-
agement, the peanut value chain, and others. 
•	 The	food	and	agriculture	genetic	resources	program	
(SINARGEAA) is set up to conserve genetic material and 
carry out basic research. Under this mechanism, a number 
of research organizations and universities have been given 
the responsibility to manage and evaluate genetic resources 
in sectors such as roots and tubers, fruits, cereals and oil-
seeds, Andean grains, forestry, and camelids. 
Further coordination and interaction activities are pro-
vided through the Accompanying Committee of SIBTA (CAS), 
which consists of government and donor representatives and 
determines funding procedures and revises implementation 
strategies for the three mechanisms mentioned above. Another 
useful coordination mechanism, especially with regard to the 
implementation of funding strategies, is the consultative com-
mittee, Comité Consultivo del SIBTA, which consists of repre-
sentatives from the UTS, the four regional foundations, and 
several universities.
The SIBTA bylaws outline the main rules for the operation 
of the system, and have been adjusted four times since 2002. 
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Box 3: Relationships between SIBTA  
    agents according to the  
    original design
Source: Developed on the basis of SIBTA bylaws and the mid-term evaluations in 
2004 and the evaluation of final effects and impacts in 2006. White boxes indicate 
that the actors exist independently from SIBTA’s setting. The hierarchical power of 
each category of actors in terms of funding and priority-setting decisions decreases 
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Some rules have also been determined by the IDB and other 
donors. The criteria for selecting project proposals is strict,  
and compliance is monitored by the UCPSA. Box 3 provides  
an organizational chart of SIBTA as it was originally intended 
to function.
SIBTA’s Performance and the  
Bolivian Government
SIBTA is a novel institution and as such is accumulating infor-
mation and experience to assure that it lives up to its potential. 
In the beginning, it had to establish working procedures among 
the different organizations involved. The regional foundations 
had to learn how to actively pursue opportunities for innova-
tion among small farmers and have been particularly successful 
in maintaining financial integrity, accountability, and capable 
and motivated staff. 
However, some stakeholders—including local civil-society 
organizations, development theorists and practitioners, and 
especially Bolivia’s new government—have criticized SIBTA 
for not reaching enough of those in need. Various evaluation 
studies indicate that many farmers have not been able to par-
ticipate in SIBTA’s applied projects and have not profited from 
the new knowledge and technology promoted through SIBTA. 
Anecdotal evidence from the field suggests that many applied 
technology projects have led to significant increases in income 
and resource management, and though others have had only 
marginal impact, they have strengthened farmers’ capacities in 
general. Satisfaction among the beneficiaries served by the ser-
vice providers is often high, as some evaluation studies show.
A permanent question regarding SIBTA has been whether 
the government has been sufficiently active and enabling in 
order to assure its success. Whereas some stakeholders argue 
that SIBTA’s institutional design—based on the principle of 
decentralization and private service provision—has systemati-
cally weakened the government’s position, others argue that 
SIBTA needed to be designed in a way that assures continuity 
despite political changes and inadequate governance by political 
decisionmakers and that it was effective in this regard. Many 
observers found that the former government demonstrated little 
interest in SIBTA, perhaps as the result of the government’s 
limited influence on the system.
Box 4: Studying the role of governments in innovation systems
The governance of innovation systems has to do with how decisionmakers develop hierarchies and programs that foster and 
stimulate the generation and diffusion of knowledge and technologies in a given national or regional context in response 
to stakeholder needs. Good governance rules suggest taking into consideration complex structures and multiple agents, the 
uncertainty and multicausality of innovation, the limitations in controlling the innovation process, and the anticipation of 
risk. It can focus on central, regional, or local governments. Drawing from parameters of good governance as developed by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others, an analysis of the role of governments can take into 
account the following parameters:
•	 Participation	in	priority	setting:	To what extent do governments set the agenda for research and innovation and 
provide normative guidelines for the operations? To what extent do they participate in priority setting and decisions on 
funding? To what extent do governments let other stakeholders and beneficiaries participate?
•	 Approach	to	transparency	and	accountability: To what extent does the government foster the open exchange of 
information and render accounts?
•	 Responsiveness: In what way does the government respond to the various demands and needs of the potential benefi-
ciaries of innovations? 
•	 Impact	orientation: In what way does the government make sure that operations aiming to generate and diffuse innova-
tions are carried out in the most effective and efficient way and are oriented to areas where they may have the greatest impact?
•	 Delegation: To what extent does the government delegate responsibilities and pass decisionmaking power to local 
governments and other associated semipublic and private organizations?
•	 Strengthening	linkages:	In what way does the government foster collaboration and the exchange of knowledge  
among innovating agents through mechanisms such as development platforms, meetings and seminars, and financing 
of collaboration.
•	 Strategic	vision:	To what extent has the government developed a strategic vision of how the innovation system should 
develop, and in what way will it support this development?Studying the Government’s Role in SIBTA
In the context of the innovation systems approach, governments 
are facilitators of innovation processes, using a variety of options 
and styles in a given structural setting such as SIBTA, to steer 
and govern the actions and interactions of innovating agents. 
This can include providing research and technical assistance. The 
following section presents the results of a study on the role of the 
Bolivian government in SIBTA’s operations. The study was car-
ried out between June and November 2006 by IFPRI as part of 
a project on organizational learning in SIBTA, and was funded 
by DFID, drawing also from collaboration with the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Box 4 explains the 
methodological approach to the study.
Information for the study was gathered from surveys, 
interviews, a review of regulations and bylaws, and expert 
consultation. Overall, 54 key actors in organizations operating 
under SIBTA were questioned on the role of the government. In 
addition to this qualitative data, the analysis drew upon quanti-
tative relational data—information on the interaction of actors 
with each other. The data was then visualized through relational 
graphs (see Box 5). The results of the analysis of the governance 
parameters suggest the following:
Participation in priority setting: The central government—
specifically, the Ministry of Agriculture—participated in SIBTA’s 
initial design and oversaw its strategic orientation and general 
priority setting. However, it did not get involved in decisionmak-
ing on the level of projects, regional commodity chains, subsec-
tor development, or research and development; these were left 
to the regional foundations and the service providers. At times, 
donor influence was condescending, partly due to weak govern-
ment entities on the lower decisionmaking levels and disinter-
est on the higher levels. On the regional level, the semipublic 
regional foundations oversaw calls for proposals, support for 
project development, project funding, setting of regional priori-
ties, and evaluation. Some producers’ associations participated in 
decisionmaking by serving on the foundations’ boards. However, 
a more prominent role for civil-society and farmers’ organiza-
tions and local governments would have been in line with the 
public mandate of the foundations. In the national and regional 
decisionmaking processes, SIBTA’s bylaws and donor directives 
have often played a more important role than has dialogue with 
beneficiaries.
Box 5 depicts the normative role of the government in set-
ting priorities, the participation of other agents in the process, 
and the way those priorities are imposed on other SIBTA actors. 
 
Source: Study data. 
The directions of the arrows show the nodes that impose and communicate priorities and the nodes that are affected by this. The size of the nodes is proportional to the out-
degree centrality, in this case the number of ties a node uses to communicate directives on priorities to other types of actors. Nodes that have high out-degree centrality usually 
have more power and influence at their disposal and are able to communicate intensively and influence many others. Thicker arrows mean that there is stronger influence (on 















Box 5: Priority-setting relationships among SIBTA actorsIt is derived from mapping relational data collected from inter-
views with key actors regarding who communicates priorities to 
whom. Some nodes represent specific actors such as the UTS, 
UCPSA, or CAS, while others represent general actors such as 
the foundations, farmers’ associations, or local governments.
Box 5 shows that the regional foundations—the FDTAs—
are at the center of the priority-setting process and receive 
directives from all sides, most strongly from the producers. 
They communicate these priorities to knowledge providers such 
as research centers and private consultants as well as commer-
cial agents such as private buyers and input providers, who are 
becoming involved in applied innovation projects. Commercial 
agents have no influence on SIBTA’s priorities. Government 
organizations such as the UTS and UCPSA receive inputs with 
regard to priorities from producers and donors, then process 
them and pass them along to the regional foundations.
 
Approach to transparency and accountability: SIBTA has 
achieved a comfortable degree of transparency with regard to the 
use of funds; it is less transparent with its results and impacts, 
partly due to the absence of baseline data and to the limita-
tions in the diffusion of evaluation results. Various and at times 
overlapping efforts were made to develop information databases, 
with mixed success. There are still too many procedures involved 
in collecting data that are not adequately used in the end. A 
more active role by the government in accountability issues 
would be useful.
Responsiveness: SIBTA has become so responsive to farm-
ers’ demands that it has begun to neglect the identification of 
strategic problems and opportunities through mechanisms other 
than calls for proposals through the foundations. However, the 
foundations, which are in direct contact with farmers’ groups 
and other local actors, have been responsive by detecting genuine 
demand and facilitating the development of proposals as well as 
organizing regional priority-setting exercises. Higher government 
officials, who often see themselves as normative decisionmakers 
working at the behest of the government and the electorate, have 
not been as responsive.
Impact orientation: The evaluation procedures the government 
has requested from SIBTA actors, often as the result of donor 
directives, have substantial limitations. Evaluations commonly 
focus solely on adoption rates at the expense of a coherent inter-
pretation of the development context and the identification of 
learning opportunities. Medium-term evaluations are common, 
but usually do not provide platforms for stakeholders and benefi-
ciaries to discuss the reorientation of the project and opportuni-
ties to achieve higher impact. Furthermore, impact orientation 
has been less prominent among the smaller knowledge providers, 
who instead seek to minimize efforts and inputs and carry out 
activities according to plan. Another limitation is that the SIBTA 
bylaws do not provide much room for adjustment once funding 
is approved.
Delegation: Within SIBTA, the government successfully del-
egated demand identification, project planning, and monitoring 
functions to the regional foundations; this brought the planning 
and administration of research and extension closer to the farm-
ers. However, it was not as successful in delegating decisionmak-
ing functions regarding the allocation of project funds and in 
including all the actors involved in local innovation processes; 
in fact, due to SIBTA’s regulations, universities, NGOs, and 
commercial agents have been rather excluded from the process. 
Both government units—the UTS and the UCPSA—were not 
comfortable with delegating responsibilities to lower hierarchies 
or nongovernmental actors. For example, the UTS set priorities 
for research and innovation on a national level and was at times 
unwilling to accept that the foundations prioritized other subsec-
tors or commodities on the regional level. UCPSA was reluctant 
to delegate financial responsibilities to the administrative depart-
ments of the foundations. As a consequence, the government 
became wrapped up in minutiae, impeding its involvement in 
setting policies of wider strategic importance. 
Strengthening linkages: Linkages among innovation actors, par-
ticularly beneficiaries and knowledge service providers, were cre-
ated as part of the rules of disbursement of funds and were often 
brokered by the regional foundations. In a few cases, the founda-
tions have promoted linkages to buyers and input providers as 
well. The central government has been less effective in forging 
linkages; for example, few applied projects were connected with 
strategic research and few links to universities were established. It 
did try to foster connections with international research organi-
zations, but encountered limits because there were no national 
programs with leaders that could follow up on specific linkages.
Strategic vision: The government’s role has been limited due to 
its insufficient capacity and a lack of data to conduct more in-
depth policy analyses. Furthermore, much of the government’s 
resources and time, particularly that of the technical unit in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, were devoted to maintaining national 
dialogues that did not always lead to concrete policies and deci-
sions. The technical unit’s strategic innovation projects (PIENs) 
only began to gain momentum in 2005, though there are already 
indications that the projects are too few and too small to provide 
the necessary strategic research results the country needs. 
Conclusions
Governance in innovation systems is less about executing re-
search and administering extension services, and has more to do 
with guiding diverse actors involved in complex innovation pro-
cesses through the rules and incentives that foster the creation, 
application, and diffusion of knowledge and technologies. The 
role the government plays in fostering agricultural innovation 
depends on institutional regulations; the strength, weaknesses, 
and motivation of the actors who contribute to innovation; and 
the style of governance. 
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The findings of this study on governance in the Bolivian 
agricultural innovation system suggest that weak leadership and 
limited commitment—rather than the decentralized structural 
setting—have prevented the Bolivian government, particularly the 
Ministry of Agriculture, from taking a more active role in steering 
SIBTA. Further obstacles to a more prominent government role 
include limited policy-analysis and strategic-planning capacities 
and a tendency to focus on minute details at the project level.
In order to foster efficient agricultural innovation processes 
in a decentralized funding scheme such as SIBTA, the govern-
ment needs to actively establish priorities, assure that others 
participate, guarantee transparency and accountability, maintain 
responsiveness to the demands of users, focus on impact, delegate 
administrative responsibilities to local agencies that are closer to 
the farmers, strengthen linkages among the various innovating 
agents, and provide a strategic vision. For a more effective gov-
ernance of national agricultural innovation systems, governments 
should focus on general development issues and pursue oppor-
tunities via incentives given to a broad range of actors involved 
in innovation processes, including farmers, commercial agents, 
NGOs, government agencies, and producer organizations that 
promote new knowledge and technology.
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